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PERFORMANCE ISN’T EVERYTHING:
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONCEPTUAL
COMPETENCE IN OUTCOME ASSESSMENT
OF EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING
STEFAN H. KRIEGER*
SERGE A. MARTINEZ**
This article scrutinizes—and ultimately rejects—the recommendations of the Carnegie Report for outcome assessments in experiential legal education. The Carnegie Report argues that practical
education should focus on teaching students to mimic the actions of
expert lawyers by encouraging students to follow expert protocols,
procedures, rules, and checklists that can enable them to deal effectively with lawyering situations. To the contrary, however, an extensive body of cognitive science and neuroscience research on the
development of expertise questions the theoretical underpinnings of
the Carnegie Report and suggests that educators should focus not on
what experts are doing but on what they are thinking as they deal with
a lawyering problem. Therefore, this article proposes that outcome
assessments in experiential legal education should focus primarily on
students learning to reason in practice, and presents an experimental
assessment technique designed to evaluate student reasoning in practice. Ultimately, the Carnegie critique developed in this article has significant implications for the drafting of the final ABA standards on
outcome assessments which are likely to reach the final stage of the
adoption process in late 2012 or early 2013.

INTRODUCTION
On January 15, 2009, US Airways Flight 1549 flew through a flock
* Professor of Law and Director Emeritus of Clinical Programs, Maurice A. Deane
School of Law at Hofstra.
** Clinical Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra. A version of
this paper was presented in May 2010 at a meeting of the Section on Clinical Legal Education of the Association of American Law Schools in Baltimore, Maryland, and we wish to
thank the participants at that conference for their comments and suggestions on this research. We also wish to thank the clinical faculty at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at
Hofstra for their comments on this manuscript, Theo Liebmann for his assistance on the
student interviews, all of the students who agreed to participate in the interviews, Ian
Weinstein and Mary Lynch for their assistance in understanding the procedures of the
American Bar Association, Dr. Vimla Patel for her comments and insights on the cognitive
science of expertise, and our research assistants Joseph Losos and Jessica Chiavara. Finally,
we would like to thank the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra for providing the
research support that made this Article possible.
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of geese on takeoff from LaGuardia Airport, sucking birds into both
of its engines. The engines immediately went dead, turning the plane
into a low-flying, extremely heavy glider.1
In an emergency situation, US Airways procedures call for the
first officer to take the controls, so the captain’s decision making is
unencumbered by the distraction of actually trying to fly the plane.2
On Flight 1549, however, Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger assessed the situation and broke with protocol, taking the controls himself. Captain Sullenberger knew that he was the more experienced
pilot, he was looking out the side of the plane that faced all the important local landmarks, and furthermore he was not up-to-date with
emergency protocols for that particular aircraft. Sully also knew that
the first officer, Jeff Skiles, had recently been through training for the
aircraft and would therefore more easily find the appropriate checklists and protocols in the bulky emergency handbook.3
Unaware that the engines had been damaged beyond repair by
the goose strikes, First Officer Skiles quickly initiated the three-page
protocol for the loss of both engines.4 While Skiles was struggling to
restart the engines per standard procedure, Sully was considering the
options for bringing the plane down safely. He saw that Teterboro
Airport, in New Jersey, was too far away to reach at their airspeed and
rate of descent. He also calculated that they did not have the ability to
turn around and return safely to LaGuardia.5 Outside the aircraft, it
was a calm, clear day. The Hudson River, while dangerously cold, was
also home to a great deal of river traffic, which meant that rescuers
would be able to reach the plane quickly. Concluding that the safest
course of action would be to land in the river, Sully guided the plane
to a smooth landing, preserving the lives of everyone aboard. The
whole event unfolded in just a few minutes, so quickly that Skiles did
not make it past the first page of the three-page checklist for engine
failure by the time they hit the water.6
Sully obviously demonstrated consummate flying skills by piloting the powerless plane through a gentle descent and then a controlled
1 Robert D. McFadden, Pilot is Hailed after Jetliner’s Icy Plunge, N.Y. Times A1 (January 16, 2009).
2 Sully’s Tale, AIR & SPACE MAG. (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.airspacemag.com/flighttoday/Sullys-Tale.html.
3 Id.
4 National Transportation Safety Board, Loss of Thrust in Both Engines After Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the Hudson River, US Airways Flight
1549, Airbus A320-214, N106US, Weehawken, New Jersey, January 15, 2009, 82.
5 Sully’s Tale, supra note 2.
6 The protocol was designed for high-altitude engine failure, not low-altitude failure.
The solution proposed by the NTSB was to create additional checklists for low-altitude
emergencies. National Transportation Safety Board, supra note 4, at 52.
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landing in the middle of the Hudson River. But focusing on Sully’s
flying performance can obscure an important element of the incident:
the reasoning underlying his performance. To successfully land the
plane, Sully ignored the US Airways protocols for command and did
not rely on the procedure for restarting the engines. If Sully and Skiles
had simply performed the procedures they had been trained to follow,
perhaps things would have ended much less successfully. Instead,
Sully quickly created a new plan to account for the specifics of the
situation. His quick thinking led to the actions that saved the lives of
the crew and passengers.
Captain Sullenberger’s decision making on Flight 1549 highlights
the importance of the cognitive process in expertise. Experts do not
simply perform well. They must also reason well.
The lessons about expertise that this story reveals should concern
the American Bar Association (“ABA”). The ABA has recently signaled its intention to make a major change in its accreditation standards for law schools by moving away from the current focus on input
measures—what students are taught in law school7—to a focus on
learning outcomes—what students learn in law school.8 In 2007,
amidst a growing chorus calling for the incorporation of outcome
measures into American legal education,9 the ABA’s Council of the
7 The current Standard 302(a) mandates a law school to “require that each student
receive substantial instruction in:
1. the substantive law generally regarded as necessary to effective and responsible
participation in the legal profession;
2. legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem solving, and oral
communication;
3. writing in a legal context, including at least one rigorous writing experience in
the first year and at least one additional rigorous writing experience after the
first year;
4. other professional skills generally regarded as necessary for effective and responsible participation in the legal profession; and
5. the history, goals, structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members.”
ABA Sec. on Legal Educ. & Admission to the Bar, 2012-2013 Standards and Rules of
Procedure for Approval of Law Schools (2012) [hereinafter Standards].
8 ABA Sec. on Legal Educ. & Admission to the Bar, Report of the Outcome Measures
Committee 1 (July 27, 2008) [hereinafter Outcomes Report].
9 See, e.g., GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS 50
(2000) (“If a law school is to be effective as an educational institution, it needs to be guided
by student outcomes—a statement of the knowledge, abilities, and attributes its students
should derive from their legal education.”); ROY STUCKEY & OTHERS, BEST PRACTICES
FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP 42 (2007) (urging law schools to
describe “what the school’s students will be able to do after graduating and how they will
do it in addition to what they will know”); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH
WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 180-2 (2007) (endorsing and commending Munro’s
exhortations for “greater institutional intentionality”—including the use of outcome measures—in student learning); John O. Sonsteng, Donna Ward, Colleen Bruce and Michael
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Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (the “Council”) created a “Special Committee on Output Measures” (the “Outcome Subcommittee”) and charged it with determining “whether and
how [the Council] can use output measures, other than bar passage
and job placement, in the accreditation process.”10 After conducting a
thorough review of legal education around the world, professions
other than law, and American legal scholarship about outcomes,11 the
Outcome Subcommittee’s report recommended a re-examination and
reframing of the Standards for Approval of Law Schools (the “Standards”) “to reduce their reliance on input measures and instead adopt
a greater and more overt reliance on outcome measures.”12
Responding to the Outcome Subcommittee’s report, the ABA
Standards Review Committee has proposed new approval criteria (the
“Proposed Standards”) that heavily incorporate outcome measures.
The latest version of the Proposed Standards13 would require each law
school to articulate the outcomes it will seek to give its students.14 In
conjunction with selecting outcomes, law schools would be required to
design a curriculum to create those outcomes,15 assess student learning through a variety of methods, give students meaningful feedback,16 and regularly and continuously assess their success at
achieving their student learning outcome goals.17
Although the proposed changes to the accreditation requirements
Peterson, A Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303, 456 (2007) (calling on law schools to incorporate into
their curricula “general and specific learning objectives that provide students an opportunity to demonstrate a predetermined competency level.”).
10 ABA Sec. on Legal Educ. & Admission to the Bar, Interim Report of the Outcome
Measures Committee 1 (May 12, 2008).
11 Outcomes Report, supra note 8, at 1.
12 Id.
13 See ABA Sec. on Legal Educ. & Admission to the Bar, Draft Report for the April
2012 Meeting of the ABA Standards Review Committee (2012) [hereinafter Draft Report].
As of this writing in September 2012, the Draft Report is in the final stages of consideration by the Standards Review Committee. At its July 2012 meeting, the Standards Review
Committee conducted its scheduled second consideration of the Proposed Standards without making changes to the relevant sections. The Proposed Standards are scheduled for a
third and tentatively final consideration at its November 2012 meeting. After the final review, the Committee will send the Draft Report to the Council. The Council will then
review the Draft Report and conduct a public comment process, including holding public
hearings. If the Council decides to revise or amend the Standards, the ABA House of
Delegates must review the changes. The House of Delegates will then either concur in the
revisions or send them back to the Council for additional consideration, but the Council
has the final authority with respect to adoption of revisions. Standards, supra note 7, at vivii, Standard 803, Internal Operating Practices 9, 11.
14 Draft Report, supra note 13, at Standard 302(a).
15 Id. at Standard 304(a).
16 Id. at Standard 305.
17 Id. at Standard 306(a).
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would generally afford law schools flexibility in determining their own
learning outcomes, they also include several required outcome goals.
One mandatory outcome measure that schools would be required to
adopt is “competency as an entry-level practitioner” in “a depth in
and breadth of” professional skills.18 This requirement would represent a significant change for experiential legal education: at present, law schools are required only to provide “substantial instruction”
in professional skills, with no competency requirement.19
Requiring law schools to focus on instruction for competency in
skills is a laudable goal. However, neither the proposed standards nor
the proposed interpretations attempt to define the nature of competency in skills. To effectively apply Proposed Standard 302(b), the
ABA will first need to articulate a definition of competency in practice: is it simply the ability to perform certain skills, or, as in Sully’s
case, the ability to effectively reason through problems in practice?
Much of the recent focus by the ABA—and legal scholarship—
on defining learning outcomes has been influenced by the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching’s 2007 monograph, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Practice of Law 20 (the “Carnegie
Report” or the “Report” or “Carnegie”), which argues that law
schools should make a greater effort to prepare students for the professional practice of law.21 Carnegie draws heavily on the work of Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus22 to articulate a theory of expert
legal practice based on performance. This theory leads to a model for
training law students in lawyering skills that stresses the importance of
learning the concepts and procedures of the legal profession in a way
that is structured for performance. By focusing on performance as the
measure of competence, Carnegie emphasizes the importance to curriculum design and outcome assessment of protocols and techniques
for performing particular lawyering tasks.
In reaching its conclusions, Carnegie had the benefit of another
report on legal education reform, Best Practices for Legal Education 23
(“Best Practices”). Best Practices was published in 2007 by the Clinical
18 Id. at Standard 302(b). Although the Proposed Standards are silent about which professional skills are required to give sufficient depth and breadth, a proposed Interpretation
indicates that “interviewing, counseling, negotiation, fact development and analysis, conflict resolution, organization and management of legal work, collaboration, cultural competency, and self-evaluation are among the professional skills that could fulfill” this Proposed
Standard. Id. at Interpretation 302-2.
19 Standards, supra note 7, at Standard 302.
20 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9.
21 See infra notes 28–40 and accompanying text.
22 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 116-19. See infra notes 66–79 and accompanying
text.
23 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 9.
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Legal Education Association, a national organization of clinical law
professors, with the purpose of providing “a vision of what legal education might become if legal educators step back and consider how
they can most effectively prepare students for practice.”24 Like Carnegie, Best Practices focuses on performance as a measure of competency and suggests varied techniques for teaching law students the
tools of the trade.25
However, current research into expert practice indicates that the
ability to follow protocols is not a fully accurate reflection of competence.26 As is apparent from the landing of Flight 1549, experts do not
simply rely on standardized protocols. Sully quickly reasoned through
the problem and crafted an appropriate solution. His quick reasoning
in the problem-solving process highlights the centrality of cognition to
his expertise as a pilot.
Current research into expert practice indicates that reasoning is
an important element of expertise not only in the work of piloting an
airplane, but also in the practice of professional skills such as lawyering. Expertise in practice involves thinking, reasoning, and decision-making processes.27 Therefore, this research indicates that to
teach law students to handle their clients’ problems expertly, learning
objectives should include the development of effective reasoning
strategies to handle different and varied problems, not just the ability
to perform in prescribed ways.
Given the influence of Carnegie, a strong possibility exists that
the ABA—or a law school following the lead of Carnegie—will unreflectively define “competency of an entry-level practitioner” primarily in terms of the ability to perform certain lawyering tasks rather
than the capacity to reason in practice. The ramifications of such a
definition for legal education would be quite significant. If Carnegie’s
approach to learning outcomes prevails, all aspects of experiential legal education—from curriculum development to individual course design to outcome assessment—will be focused on training students for
standard performance, not for reasoning in practice.
In this Article, we respond to the ABA’s call for increased focus
on learning outcomes by critically examining the nature of “competency in practice.” Relying on cognitive science research on the qualities of expertise, we, unlike Carnegie, propose that outcomes in
experiential legal education should be focused primarily on students
learning to reason in practice. In Part I we describe the approach to
24
25
26
27

Id. at 1.
See infra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., infra notes 95–131 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 80–131 and accompanying text.
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legal education, especially the theories of experiential learning and expertise, underpinning the Carnegie Report. In Part II we present findings on expert practice from current cognitive science research and
contrast them with the performance-based focus of Carnegie. In Part
III we address the different measures of outcome assessment that follow from Carnegie’s approach and from our approach. In Part IV, we
describe and consider the applications of our own experiment in assessing reasoning in practice, which asks students to think aloud as
they reason through problems. Finally, in Part V, we provide recommendations to the ABA and to law schools in defining learning outcomes such that assessment methods can be tailored to measuring the
development of professional expertise. We hope that this article will
influence the outcome assessment conversation in a constructive way.
I. THE CARNEGIE REPORT
To describe its vision of professional competence, Carnegie identifies what it calls “the three apprenticeships” of professional education.28 The first of these focuses on student knowledge and “the way
of thinking” of the legal profession.29 Carnegie calls this the cognitive
apprenticeship.30 The second is the practical apprenticeship, which is
concerned with “the forms of expert practice shared by competent
practitioners.”31 The third is the ethical and social apprenticeship,
which incorporates “the purposes and attitudes that are guided by the
values for which the professional community is responsible.”32 Carnegie argues that law schools have focused overwhelmingly on the
first apprenticeship, to the neglect of the second and third.
A. The Signature Pedagogy
Carnegie asserts that traditional legal education has been narrowly focused on the cognitive apprenticeship, through the almost
universal use of the “case-dialogue” method of education, in which
professors lead students through discussions of appellate cases to
tease out legal analysis. Carnegie calls the case-dialogue method the
“signature pedagogy” of legal education, its distinct method for inducting new members into the profession.33 Assessing the success of
28

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 28.
Id. at 28.
30 Id. at 60.
31 Id. at 28.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 23. The signature pedagogies of other professions described by Carnegie include “the varieties of design and performance studio in engineering and architecture, bedside teaching and clinical rounds in medicine and nursing, the interpretation of texts and
instruction in preaching in seminaries.” Id.
29
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law schools’ signature pedagogy in “preparing students for the complex demands of professional work—to think, to perform, and to conduct themselves like professionals,”34 Carnegie finds it wanting. While
endorsing the case-dialogue method in the first year of law school as a
method of initiating students into the study of law, Carnegie criticizes
law schools’ overemphasis on legal analysis through continued use of
the case-dialogue method with diminishing returns in the second and
third years.35
Carnegie argues that, although the signature pedagogy rapidly socializes students into an academic approach to studying law,36 and adequately teaches students to engage in legal analysis and to “think like
a lawyer,”37 it has several consequences. Rather than preparing students to become lawyers, the signature pedagogy works to “prolong
and reinforce the habits of thinking like a student rather than an apprentice practitioner.”38 Carnegie argues that a narrow focus on legal
analysis has a “corrosive effect”39 on professional development because it marginalizes practical and ethical aspects of lawyering. To
remedy the current imbalance in legal education, the Carnegie Report
argues that legal education should establish a new signature pedagogy,
one that incorporates training in cognitive, practical, and ethical aspects of law through “educational experiences oriented toward preparation for practice.”40
B. A Model for Learning from Practice
An important aspect of Carnegie’s model is its proposal for increased emphasis on the practical apprenticeship in legal education. In
the traditional legal apprenticeship, as Carnegie describes it, a significant amount of learning came informally from observation and imitation of an expert.41 The expert modeled performance in such a way
that the learner could eventually imitate the performance, while the
expert provided feedback to guide the learner in making the activity
his or her own.42
Carnegie acknowledges that the traditional apprenticeship, consisting of an extended, close, individual relationship designed to offer
practical training, is not realistic in legal education today. Nonethe34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 27.
at 77.
at 186.
at
at
at
at
at

188.
77.
88.
26–27, 98.
26.
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less, Carnegie purports to reformulate the apprenticeship model to incorporate the benefits of such a relationship into a modern
educational setting.43 In its reformulation, Carnegie urges that the
central elements of expert performance should be passed on in a more
formal fashion. They should be studied, distilled, simplified, and
taught to novices “in the form of rules, procedures, protocols and organizing metaphors for approaching situations or problems.”44 Carnegie refers to these devices as “scaffolds.”45 A scaffold could be, for
example, a particular interviewing procedure, a protocol for problem
solving, a technique for negotiating a deal, or a method for drafting a
contract. With its focus on techniques and procedures, Carnegie’s
model is based on studying the performance of experts and teaching
students to imitate that performance.
In the Carnegie model, increased competence comes as a student
gradually accumulates a “toolkit of well-founded procedures”46 in different areas of legal practice. Within this performance framework,
“the prime learning task of the novice in law is to achieve a basic
acquaintance with the common techniques of the lawyer’s craft.”47 In
this approach, student reasoning takes a backseat to learning expert
techniques. In fact, Carnegie argues that reasoning and attention to
context by novice learners is unhelpful; instead, it posits that students
should be taught to “recognize certain well-defined elements of the
situation and apply precise and formal rules to these elements, regardless of what else is happening.”48 To Carnegie, the goal of the practical
apprenticeship should be that students accumulate experience by
practicing in accordance with the rules.49 With this learning goal, the
focus of educators tasked with teaching novice practitioners should
therefore be on particular “scaffolds,” the techniques, rules, and procedures of expert practice.
C. Using Scaffolds in Legal Education
The two examples below illustrate the types and uses of scaffolds
in a performance-based model of practical legal education:
1. The T-Funnel Interview
As an example of the concept of a scaffold for law students, Car43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

100.
99.
98.
103.
117.
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negie points to the textbook Lawyers as Counselors,50 which provides
a framework for legal interviewing and counseling developed by several law professors. The text offers step-by-step methods, identifying a
set of “practical guides and techniques”51 for novice interviewers and
counselors.
One of Lawyers as Counselors’ techniques that is touted by Carnegie is “T-funnel” interviewing. Such an interview “is a pattern of
information-seeking”52 with two elements: open questions—the upper
part of the T—induce clients to think freely about the problem and
elicit information from the clients’ perspective. Closed questions—the
lower part of the T—are used to focus narrowly on gathering information related to specific legal aspects of the client’s problem. The premise underlying this technique is that “thorough informationgathering rests on a combination of open and closed questions”53 in a
particular sequence: start with an open question and gradually narrow
the questioning.
Expanding on the basic T-funnel concept, Lawyers as Counselors
gives techniques for using the T-funnel in specific interview situations,
such as gathering information about a specific event or a particular
topic. Lawyers as Counselors also provides techniques for resolving
problems frequently encountered by beginners, such as avoiding getting sidetracked, “cycling” through multiple T-funnels to capture as
much information as possible, and facilitating recollection in forgetful
clients.54 The scaffold gives a novice a variety of techniques to use in
different interviewing situations.
For a teacher, using a scaffold in Carnegie’s model takes on a
distinct form: the scaffold is introduced to students, who are given
multiple opportunities to practice using it, and to receive feedback
from the instructor on how they use it. In this way, scaffolds can help
guide students’ “assimilation of more skillful practice.”55 By practicing
the application of the T-funnel technique to interviewing, a student
can accumulate enough experience with this scaffold to allow her to
master its application. The T-funnel technique will then become part
of the “toolkit” that, according to Carnegie, the student must assemble to achieve “skilled performance”—the goal of the practical
apprenticeship.56
50
BLAY,

51
52
53
54
55
56

DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BRUCE BERGMAN, SUSAN C. PRICE & PAUL R. TREMLAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004).
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 102.
DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., supra note 50, at 167.
Id.
Id. at 167-78.
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 101-2.
Id. at 124.
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2. The PrOACT Methodology for Problem Solving
A second example of a scaffold for novices comes from Best Practices.57 As an example of an effective methodology for helping novices
develop skills for problem solving,58 Best Practices presents the
PrOACT method of decision making, with its broad applicability and
ease of recall.59 The acronym PrOACT is created from these five
steps: Problem, Objectives, Alternatives, Consequences, Tradeoffs.60
In this methodology, the lawyer 1) defines the problem to be solved,
2) determines the desired objective(s), 3) identifies alternative courses
of action, 4) evaluates the consequences of each alternative, and 5)
structures how to make tradeoffs among objectives and alternatives as
a prelude to making the decision.61 The scaffold is a straightforward
technique for structuring the task of problem solving.
D. The Impact of Carnegie
It would be difficult to overstate the influence of the Carnegie
Report on recent scholarship about legal education. The Report has
been cited as an authority on legal education in countless scholarly
articles across a broad spectrum of pedagogical issues.62 Several con57

See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 64.
Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., Charlotte S. Alexander, Learning to Be Lawyers: Professional Identity and
the Law School Curriculum, MD. L. REV. 465 (2011) (using Carnegie as a “starting point”
for integrating professionalism into curriculum); Kathleen M. Burch and Chara Fisher
Jackson, Creating the Perfect Storm: How Partnering with the ACLU Integrates the Carnegie
Report’s Three Apprenticeships, 3 J. MARSHALL L.J. 51 (2009) (describing a course designed explicitly to integrate Carnegie’s recommendations); Kate Nace Day & Russell G.
Murphy, “Just Trying to Be Human in This Place”: Storytelling and Film in the First Year
Law School Classroom, 39 STETSON L. REV. 247 (2009) (describing use of storytelling in
terms of Carnegie’s critiques of legal education); Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions
of Law and Legal Education: Perspectives on Curriculum Reform, Mercer Law School’s
Woodruff Curriculum and . . .“Perspectives,” 63 MERCER L. REV. 975 (2012) (relying on
Carnegie to support argument for requiring “perspectives” courses); Madeline June Kass,
Educating the Next Generation of Environmental Lawyers, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T
52 (2010) (describing efforts of environmental law teachers to respond to Carnegie); Harriet N. Katz, Evaluating the Skills Curriculum: Challenges and Opportunities for Law
Schools, 59 MERCER L. REV. 909 (2008) (suggesting ways to change skills curriculum in
light of Carnegie’s goals for skills education); Patricia Grande Montana, Lessons from the
Carnegie and Best Practices Reports: A Look at St. John’s University School of Law’s Street
Law Program as a Model for Teaching Professional Skills, 11 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. &
CLINICAL L. 97 (2008) (citing conformity with Carnegie’s suggestions as support for effectiveness of Street Law course); Ira Steven Nathenson, Best Practices for the Law of the
Horse: Teaching Cyberlaw and Illuminating Law through Online Simulations, 28 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 657 (2012) (proposing online simulations as a response to Carnegie’s critiques of case-analysis pedagogy); Brent E. Newton, Preaching
What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’ Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship
58
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ferences have focused on Carnegie.63 Law schools have cited the Report as inspiration for curricular design.64 Indeed, the ABA Outcomes
Subcommittee acknowledged Carnegie as a source of “significant guidance”65 in its study of outcome measures in legal education.
In light of the potential impact of the Carnegie Report on selection and definition of outcomes in the wake of the ABA’s proposed
reformulation and application of its Standards, it is important to scrutinize Carnegie’s recommendations rigorously rather than accepting
them uncritically. This scrutiny benefits from an understanding of the
theoretical origins of the expert performance model adopted by
Carnegie.
II. ROLE

OF

COGNITION

IN

EXPERT PERFORMANCE

A. Dreyfus Theory of Expertise
The crucial problem underlying Carnegie’s focus on performance
assessment is that it does not rest on a sound theoretical or empirical
foundation. Cognitive science findings challenge the expertise theory
that Carnegie employs and suggest a different approach to the issue.
This alternative approach highlights the cognitive attributes of expert
performance rather than the performance itself. Such a difference in
and Devaluation of Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C.
L. REV. 105 (2010) (citing Carnegie’s recommendations in support of radical restructuring
of law faculty); Sean M. O’Connor, Teaching IP From an Entrepreneurial Counseling and
Transactional Perspective, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 877 (2008) (citing Carnegie’s critique of
case method in support of experiential teaching of intellectual property law); John O. Sonsteng, Donna Ward, Colleen Bruce and Michael Peterson, supra note 9 (citing Carnegie as
support for the need for reform of entire legal education system); Emily Zimmerman, An
Interdisciplinary Framework for Understanding and Cultivating Law Student Enthusiasm,
58 DEPAUL L. REV. 851 (2009) (citing Carnegie for evidence of “lack of enthusiasm” of
law students).
63 See International Conference on the Future of Legal Education http://law.gsu.edu/FutureOfLegalEducationConference/ (indicating that the 2008 conference would take the
Carnegie Report as its “point of departure” for exploring the future of legal education);
Legal Education Reform after Carnegie: Bringing Law-in-Action into the Law School Classroom http://www.law.wisc.edu/ils/2010legaleducationconf/homepage.html (describing how
the 2010 conference took its “impetus” partially from the publication of Carnegie); Sharon
L. Beckman and Paul R. Tremblay, The Way to Carnegie: Practice, Practice, Practice—
Pedagogy, Social Justice and Cost in Legal Education: Foreword, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST.
215 (2012) (describing Fall 2011 conference focused on Carnegie’s emphasis on preparing
law students for practice).
64 Erwin Chemerinsky, the Founding Dean of the University of California Irvine
School of Law, designed the skills-intensive curriculum of the new law school “with the
Carnegie Report’s recommendations in mind.” Drew Coursin, Acting Like Lawyers, 2010
WIS. L. REV. 1461, 1473 (2010). See also The Third Year in Detail, http://law.wlu.edu/
thirdyear/page.asp?pageid=651 (describing Carnegie as one of the sources of insight that
was particularly influential in Washington & Lee University Law School’s development of
an entirely experiential third-year curriculum beginning in 2008).
65 Outcomes Report, supra note 8, at 5-6.
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emphasis is critical to the issue of law student assessment, because the
methods for assessing performance diverge widely from those used to
assess cognition.
Carnegie’s theory of expertise is based entirely on the work of
two brothers, Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, trained respectively as a
philosopher and an engineer.66 The Dreyfus brothers posit that expertise is simply a matter of pattern recognition.67 They argue, for example, that we are able to ride bikes because of prior experiences
operating such vehicles, not because we are engaging in some kind of
cognitive process.68 As they observe, “No detached choice or deliberation occurs. It just happens, apparently because the proficient performer has experienced similar situations in the past and memories of
them trigger plans similar to those that worked in the past and anticipation of events similar to those that occurred.”69 They call this ability
to use patterns without cognitive rules “holistic similarity recognition”
and argue, “Normally, experts don’t solve problems and don’t make
decisions; they do what normally works.”70
With this theoretical outlook, the Dreyfuses assert that acquisition of this kind of expert intuition requires the novice to learn protocols and strategies for identifying the facts and features of a particular
situation and performing in response to these facts.71 They also contend that people pass through at least five stages of qualitatively different perceptions of their tasks (novice, advanced beginner,
competence, proficiency, expertise) as they acquire a skill through in66 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 116-19. The only other source cited by the Report
on the issue of expertise is a book on nursing education which adopts the Dreyfus theory.
PATRICIA BENNER, CHRISTINE A. TANNER & CATHERINE A. CHESLA, EXPERTISE IN
NURSING PRACTICE: CARING, CLINICAL JUDGMENT, AND ETHICS (1996). Like the Dreyfus
theory, Benner’s work has also been subject to serious criticism. See, e.g., Fernand Gobet
& Philipe Chassy, Towards an Alternative to Benner’s Theory of Expert Intuition in Nursing: A Discussion Paper, 45 INT’L J. NURSING STUD. 129 (2008); Ian English, Intuition as a
Function of the Expert Nurse: A Critique of Benner’s Novice to Expert Model, 18 J. ADVANCED NURSING 387 (1993). The Carnegie Report is not alone in its wholesale adoption
of the Dreyfus model. In the medical profession, this model has also been accepted by
many physicians without any serious examination. Adolfo Peña, The Dreyfus Model of
Clinical Problem-Solving Skills Acquisition: A Critical Perspective, 15 MED. EDUC. ONLINE
1, 2 (2010), http://journals.sfu.ca/coaction/index.php/meo/article/view/4846/pdf_3.
67 HUBERT L. DREYFUS & STUART E. DREYFUS, MIND OVER MACHINE: THE POWER
OF HUMAN INTUITION AND EXPERTISE IN THE ERA OF THE COMPUTER 28 (1986).
68 Id. at 16. The Dreyfus model was derived from direct observations of experts such as
jet pilots and dancers. These types of experts are used to tackling well-structured problems,
in contrast to practitioners in other domains, such as law and medicine, who often confront
ill-structured problems. Peña, supra note 66, at 6. For the differences between these two
problem categories, see infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
69 DREYFUS & DREYFUS, supra note 67, at 28.
70 Id. at 28, 30-31.
71 See id. at 20-21.
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struction and experience.72 After progressing through these five stages
of accumulated experience, a learner develops the unconscious capacity to recognize new situations as similar to remembered ones and,
through this process, ultimately becomes an expert.73
These stages of development, the Dreyfuses claim, reflect an
evolution from the abstract toward the concrete, “from the analytic
behavior of the detached subject, consciously decomposing his environment into recognizable elements, and following abstract rules, to
involved skilled behavior based on accumulation of concrete experiences and the unconscious recognition of new situations similar to
whole remembered ones.”74 In the Dreyfuses’ own words, as students
become experts, they act “arationally.”75 In other words, expert performance is essentially mindless.76 Accordingly, under the Dreyfus approach, expertise is not reflected as much in cognitive competencies as
in mindless performances responding to perceived situations.
It should now be apparent why the Carnegie apprenticeship
model focuses on performance rather than on cognition. Consistent
with Dreyfus, Carnegie envisions that students should first learn rules,
strategies, methods, and protocols to enable them to recognize patterns and perform in particular situations.77 Following Dreyfus, the
report contends that after numerous experiences, students progress
through stages and acquire expertise. As they develop expertise, they
stop relying on abstract rules and instead respond unconsciously to
new situations by perceiving similarities to whole remembered past
experiences.78
In sum, Carnegie contends that the focus of experiential education should be primarily on performance. The desired outcome of the
educational process is the student’s “ability to judge that when a situation shows a certain pattern of elements, it is time to draw a particular
conclusion. . .[and to] act in a certain way to achieve the selected
goal.”79 From this perspective, the student’s action, rather than her
72

Id. at 19-35.
Id. at 35.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 36.
76 See Tim Thornton, Clinical Judgment, Expertise and Skilled Coping, 16 J. EVALUATION IN CLINICAL PRAC. 284, 290 (2010). See also Peña, supra note 66, at 2 (noting that
under the Dreyfus model, “the brain is a secondary or spurious referent”). It is surprising
that the clinical community, with its long tradition of encouraging the teaching of “reflective practice,” see, e.g., Richard K. Neumann, Donald Schön, the Reflective Practitioner,
and the Comparative Failures of Legal Education, 6 CLIN. L. REV. 401 (2000), has been at
the forefront of urging the adoption of a report that is based on a theory which envisions
mindlessness as the goal of legal education.
77 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 99, 117.
78 Id. at 116.
79 Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
73
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reasoning process, has paramount importance.
B. Cognitive Science Critique of the Dreyfus Theory
Most cognitive scientists recognize the role that pattern recognition plays in expert performance.80 Nonetheless, they reject the notion
that intuitive pattern recognition alone is determinative of expert performance. In fact, the Dreyfus theory conflicts with a number of empirical findings on expert decision making.
First, contrary to the Dreyfus theory, studies show that in many
domains requiring complex problem solving, expertise does not produce a decrease in abstract thought and a concurrent increase in concrete thinking. Indeed, in these domains, experts have been found to
analyze problems at a deeper, more abstract level than nonexperts.81
Second, the existence of progressive stages in expert development is
not supported by the evidence.82 The Dreyfus theory suggests that the
more experience individuals have in a particular area, the more intuition they acquire, and the more expertise they gain. Studies have
shown, however, that those individuals with extensive experience in a
field do not necessarily perform better than people with less training.83 In fact, the number of years of experience in a field is a poor
predictor of attained performance.84 It is not unusual, for example, to
observe lawyers with 30 to 40 years of experience in a particular court80 See, e.g., Vimla L. Patel, David R. Kaufman & José F. Arocha, Steering through the
Murky Waters of a Scientific Conflict: Situated and Symbolic Models of Clinical Cognition,
7 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN MED. 413, 421 (1995) (in examining cognition in medical
treatment, authors acknowledge that physicians’ performance in routine situations often
necessitates immediate nonanalytic responses and that “there are diagnostic tasks in
perceptual domains such as dermatology and radiology in which a significant degree of
skilled performance. . .rel[ies] more on pattern recognition than deliberative reasoning.”).
81 Fernand Gobet & Phillipe Chassy, Expertise and Intuition: A Tale of Three Theories,
19 MIND & MACHINE 151, 154 (2009) (observing that in physics, experts solve problems at
“a deep, abstract level, while novices perform at a superficial, concrete level.”).
82 Id.
83 K. Anders Ericsson, Deliberate Practice and Acquisition of Expert Performance: A
General Overview, 15 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 988, 989 (2008) [hereinafter Ericsson, Deliberate Practice]; K. Anders Ericsson, James Whyte & Paul Ward, Expert Performance in
Nursing: Reviewing Research on Expertise in Nursing within the Framework of the ExpertPerformance Approach, 30 ADVANCES IN NURSING SCI. E58, E59 (2007); see generally
Dennis J. Devine & Steve W.J. Kozlowski, Domain-Specific Knowledge and Task Characteristics in Decision Making, 64 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
294, 295 (1995).
84 Indeed, some studies even suggest that professional performance decreases in accuracy and consistency with length of experience. K. Anders Ericsson, The Influence of Experience and Deliberate Practice on the Development of Superior Expert Performance, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 685, 688 (K. Anders
Ericsson et al. 2006); Jean Bédard & Michelene T. H. Chi, Expertise in Auditing, 12 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 21, 29 (Supp. 1993) (suggesting performance of auditors decreased in accuracy and consistency with length of experience).
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house who are far from exhibiting expertise in their field. Finally,
neuroscience evidence does not support the notion of holistic similarity recognition. This research demonstrates that complex decision
making entails a rich connection of different neural subsystems (explicit and implicit) and an interplay between them.85
Apparently, then, some other factors must be involved in expert
performance beyond mere pattern recognition acquired through accumulated experiences. Contrary to the Dreyfus theory, most cognitive
scientists contend that, in fact, experts do use particular cognitive
processes in their decision making.86 These processes are not always
conscious and deliberate. Rather, they reflect the interaction between
implicit knowledge—unconscious abstract representations that experts have acquired through experience and their knowledge of the
domain—and explicit knowledge—explicit representations which are
conscious and can be verbalized.87
Especially in domains like law and medicine, in which complex
knowledge systems and symbolic representations play an integral role,
more is involved in making decisions than mere pattern recognition of
previous similar situations.88 For example, although she may not be
aware of all the cognitive processes involved, when a physician evaluates a patient, she is conscious of the patient’s characterization of his
symptoms, her own diagnosis of the problem, and her requests for
tests.89 By overlooking the complex and rich interaction between implicit and explicit knowledge, the Dreyfus model fails to explain skills
that are not just routines but instead involve complex tasks, such as
finding solutions to problems.90
Unlike driving a car or riding a bike, handling a legal problem in
practice requires more than intuition based on pattern recognition.
Lawyers must juggle, for example, the substantive legal doctrine, the
procedural context, the particular facts of the situation, the client’s
needs, and the cultural and social context. The Dreyfus theory may
85

Peña, supra note 66, at 5.
See, e.g., Gobet & Chassy, supra note 66, at 132; John R. Anderson, Lynn Reder &
Herbert A. Simon, Situated Learning and Education, EDUC. RESEARCHER, May 1996, at 5;
Patel et al., supra note 80, at 413.
87 See, e.g., Peña, supra note 66, at 5-6; Patel et al., supra note 80, at 421-22.
88 See, e.g., Geoff Norman, The Basic Role of Basic Science, 17 ADVANCES HEALTH
SCI. EDUC. 453, 454 (2012) (observing that “[r]ecent studies of clinical reasoning show that
expert diagnosis is characterized by . . . some form of pattern-recognition . . . followed by a
more systematic confirmation”); Patel et al., supra note 80, at 417 (examining medical profession, researchers observe, “[t]he complex and varied nature of medicine demands that a
physician acquire certain abstract biomedical models that have a certain degree of generalizability across classes of problems, and medical tasks (e.g., diagnostic and therapeutic decision making). This necessitates the development of rich symbolic representations.”).
89 Peña, supra note 66, at 6.
90 Id.
86
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account for simple procedurally-oriented skills like asking for an adjournment or conducting an inquest to obtain a default judgment, but
it does not address the kinds of complex decision making required in
most lawyering. Lawyers make decisions at a much more complex
conceptual level than just recognizing patterns, and real expertise is
associated with this higher level.
These insights from cognitive science suggest that expert lawyers
need more than simple rules, protocols, and strategies to facilitate pattern recognition. They need to acquire cognitive processes that help
them organize the abundance of information pertinent to a case.91 Yet
these essential cognitive processes are largely ignored by the
Dreyfuses and the Carnegie Report. Just as researchers have concluded that the Dreyfus theory “is too simple to account for the complex pattern of phenomena linked to expert intuition” in nursing, so
too should the same conclusion apply to the practice of law.92
C. Cognitive Processes Used by Experts
Relying on the Dreyfus model of expertise, the Carnegie Report
eschews the importance of “formal modes of thinking” and instead
emphasizes “skilled human performance” as the focus of lawyering
skills education.93 To move from novice to expert, the Report asserts,
students must acquire “the common techniques of the lawyer’s craft”
for such performance.94 In contrast to focusing simply on expert techniques and protocols, cognitive scientists have looked to the different
reasoning processes that are used by experts when making decisions in
practice. It is the students’ acquisition of these cognitive processes,
they assert, that is at least as significant, if not more significant, in the
development of expertise.
1. Expert Mental Schemas
One attribute of expertise identified by cognitive scientists is the
use of schemas, frameworks of representations that help experts engage quickly in complex reasoning. These researchers distinguish be91 See generally Anderson et al., supra note 86, at 9 (criticizing apprenticeship models
of instruction such as those touted by Carnegie, and arguing that “the real goal should be
to get students motivated and engaged in the cognitive processes that will transfer. What is
important is what cognitive processes a problem evokes and not what real-world trappings
it might have. Often real-world problems involve a great deal of busy work and offer little
opportunity to learn the target competencies.”).
92 Gobet & Chassy, supra note 66, at 132. See also Peña, supra note 66, at 6 (arguing
that “[a]nyone who wants to propose a model to develop clinical problem-solving skills,
must recognize that the skills used to solve [ill-defined] problems are of a different nature
than the skills used to solve [well-defined] problems.”).
93 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 116.
94 Id. at 116–17.
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tween working memory and long-term memory. Working memory is
equivalent to conscious thought. Our working memory is only capable
of holding seven elements of information at a time and can only deal
simultaneously with two or three items when processing information.
Therefore, anything beyond the simplest cognitive activities overwhelms working memory.95 In contrast, long-term memory can store
large amounts of information and engage in complex cognitive
processes. We are not directly conscious of long-term memory, but
“human intellectual prowess comes from this stored knowledge, not
from an ability to engage in long, complex chains of reasoning in
working memory.”96
Knowledge is stored in long-term memory in the form of
schemas. Schemas are “ordered patterns of mental representations
that encapsulate all our knowledge regarding specific objects, concepts, or events.”97 They are sophisticated, unconscious problem-solving rules that allow us to organize information efficiently. For
instance:
[w]hen faced with a problem such as (a+b)/c = d, solve for a, people
may immediately and automatically know that this problem is
solved by multiplying out the denominator as the first move. They
have an automated schema for this problem that tells them immediately, without conscious processing, how the problem should be
solved.98

We develop schemas from repeated encounters with similar situations. From those recurring experiences, we are able to categorize
which characteristics of a given event are relevant, which should be
stored for the future, and which should be rejected as irrelevant.99 For
complex problem solving such as that required in law or medicine, the
framework around which these categorizations are developed is the
basic doctrine of the profession.100
In regard to the acquisition of expertise in a profession, researchers theorize that as a result of greater experience in a particular domain, experts reflexively use their well-developed schemas to filter
out irrelevant data and focus on relevant information to derive solutions to problems.101 Experts automatically use their schemas to delve
95 John Sweller, Jeroen J. G. van Merrienboer & Fred G. W. C. Paas, Cognitive Architecture and Instructional Design, 10 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 251, 252-53 (1998).
96 Id. at 253-54.
97 Mark P. Higgins & Mary P. Tully, Hospital Doctors and Their Schemas about Appropriate Prescribing, 39 MED. EDUC. 184, 185 (2005) (citations omitted).
98 Sweller et al., supra note 95, at 257.
99 Id.
100 See Gobet & Chassy, supra note 66, at 133; Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge
and the Teaching of Creative Legal Problem Solving, 11 CLIN. L. REV. 149, 267-69 (2004).
101 Patel et al., Reasoning and Instruction in Medical Curricula, 10 COGNITION & IN-
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into the deep structure of a situation (its systematic properties), and
they seek to reformulate it in a way that enables them to use domain
knowledge and previous experience to determine a course of action.
In the field of law, the anchors for schemas are basic legal doctrine (e.g., contract, tort, property, evidence, and agency law; the rules
of procedure; professional responsibility). As novice lawyers delve
into practice, the doctrinal framework helps them to organize their
experiences, and they begin to construct schemas. As they accumulate
experiences, these schemas assist them in handling new and unfamiliar
cases more effectively and efficiently.
From a cognitive perspective, expert lawyers conducting a client
interview in a personal injury case involving an automobile accident
are not always consciously considering, for example, each element of a
negligence claim and deductively crafting a theory. Rather, their
schemas developed from past experiences, and structured around basic legal doctrines, help them to focus their inquiry semi-automatically
on those elements. In this instance, their inquiry will probably concentrate on issues relating to the actions of the two drivers before the
accident rather than the prior relationships between the parties, their
financial situations, or their family difficulties. While this process may
not be deliberate or conscious, it is as much a cognitive process as the
conscious use of an algorithm to solve a problem.102
Schema theory differs in important respects from the Dreyfuses’
model of holistic similarity recognition. While perception plays an important role in both theories, for the Dreyfuses, it is the basis for all
expert decision making. In their model, experts recognize patterns
based on their perceptions of the surface characteristics of a particular
situation and their abilities to relate those characteristics to the specific contexts of prior experiences.103 Under schema theory, however,
the expert practitioner unconsciously delves beneath these perceived
characteristics. Her mental representations are organized around con335, 339 (1993).
The Dreyfuses are incorrect when they assert that the process is mindless. A central
basis for the Dreyfuses’ contention that cognition generally plays no part in expert performance is that artificial intelligence (“AI”) researchers have been unable to develop
rules that replicate the conceptual process used by experts in decision making. Hubert L.
Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus, Making a Mind v. Modeling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence
Back at a Branchpoint, DAEDALUS, Winter 1988, at 15. The fact that AI research has not
yet reproduced the expert reasoning process does not mean, however, that such replication
is impossible. Nor does it address the insight of schema theory that the use of representational frameworks works unconsciously in expert decision making. See generally Thornton,
supra note 76, at 290; Patel et al., supra note 80, at 424.
103 DREYFUS & DREYFUS, supra note 67, at 28 (“When we speak of intuition or knowhow, we are referring to the understanding that effortlessly occurs upon seeing similarities
with previous experiences.”).

STRUCTION

102
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cepts from her domain knowledge, which she uses to discover all the
relevant facts she encounters in the situation. Although the Dreyfuses’
theory rejects the idea that internal representations guide attention,
schema theorists assert that unconscious, internal frameworks are key
features of expert practice. Such practice has a cognitive as well as a
perceptual basis, requiring the filtering out of irrelevant information
and the focusing in on relevant facts.104
The distinction between schema theory and the Dreyfuses’ model
of “holistic similarity recognition” is not merely semantic. For the
Dreyfuses, effective pedagogy in a field requires the use of protocols
and techniques to assist students in recognizing the surface patterns of
problems. Schema theory, on the other hand, suggests that the design
of effective pedagogies for experiential courses should focus on helping students acquire representational frameworks for decision making
in practice.105 With these schemas, students can delve, both consciously and unconsciously, beneath the surface of problems to deeply
analyze them. To acquire such schemas, students must have a solid
doctrinal foundation for the problems they are handling, they must be
given sufficient opportunities to engage in practice in similar cases,
and instructors must provide them with effective feedback so that they
can begin to develop their own schemas.106 This process requires more
than repeat performances of different protocols and the learning of
common techniques and procedures. Rather, it involves the development of representational frameworks for applying doctrine in practice.
2. Cognitive Flexibility
Cognitive scientists also assert that the application of knowledge
by an expert in handling ill-structured problems requires the simultaneous consideration of multiple concepts that are individually complex, a process called cognitive flexibility.107 An ill-structured problem
is characterized by some of the following conditions:
(1) [t]he place to begin to define the problem is usually not clear;
(2) there often are many contingencies to take into account; (3) how
to weigh and assess the various interdependent variables is uncertain; (4) one has to continuously reframe and reconsider what one is
104

See Gobet & Chassy, supra note 66, at 135; Patel et al., supra note 101, at 339.
Gobet & Chassy, supra note 66, at 136-37 (recommending that instructional methods
be developed to foster the acquisition of schemas).
106 Stefan H. Krieger & Serge A. Martinez, A Tale of Election Day 2008: Teaching
Storytelling Through Repeated Experiences, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 117 (2010).
107 Vimla L. Patel, Nicole A. Yoskowitz, José F. Arocha & Edward H. Shortliffe, Cognitive and Learning Sciences in Biomedical and Health Instructional Design: A Review with
Lessons for Biomedical Informatics Education, 42 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 176, 180
(2009).
105
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doing in light of new information and shifting calculations; and (5)
the goals to be sought are frequently subject to debate and refinement and are not usually susceptible to clear measurement.108

Legal problems are often ill-structured because they arise under
uncertain conditions with regard to the client’s interests, the other
party’s intentions, the controlling legal doctrine, and the procedural
constraints of the legal system. For example, in an initial interview of a
client about a landlord/tenant problem, lawyers may encounter
problems with different legal doctrines—tort, contract, and property
theories; evidentiary issues; diverse procedural obstacles; the relationship between the parties; and tricky ethical quandaries. Expert attorneys must consider all these issues at the same time and often cannot
easily compartmentalize them. In such situations, “there is not likely
to be a set, technical approach to follow to reach a solution nor necessarily a single determinant answer to resolve the matter.”109
Given the uncertain nature of ill-structured problems, cognitive
flexibility theorists contend experts do not passively relate situations
to prior experiences or retrieve well-developed schemas. Rather,
when faced with a problem, they construct meaning about the situation using the given information in conjunction with their prior knowledge and schemas.110 The prior knowledge that is brought to bear is
itself reconstructed on a case-by-case basis rather than merely retrieved from memory. This process requires the flexible use of preexisting knowledge, the ability to use multiple schemas, and the skill
to view a problem from different conceptual perspectives.111
Therefore, in training novices to handle ill-structured problems,
oversimplification of concepts is not helpful and may actually impede
acquiring expertise.112 Following the Dreyfuses, one might think that
instructors should adopt methods that simplify concepts, compartmentalize knowledge, and teach rules and strategies for performing particular skills.113 In fact, that is the recommendation of the Carnegie
Report.114 But cognitive flexibility theory shows that reductivism is
108 Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning About Practical Judgment
in Lawyering, 4 CLIN. L. REV. 247, 257 (1998).
109 See id.
110 Rand J. Spiro, Paul J. Feltovich, Michael J. Jacobson & Richard L. Coulson, Cognitive Flexibility, Constructivism, and Hypertext: Random Access Instruction for Advanced
Knowledge Acquisition in Ill-Structured Domains, in CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE TECHNOLOGY OF INSTRUCTION: A CONVERSATION 64 (Thomas M. Duffy & David H. Jonassen, eds.
1992).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 63. See also Patel et al., supra note 107, at 180.
113 See DREYFUS & DREYFUS, supra note 67, at 21-22.
114 Drawing from the Dreyfuses’ theory, the Carnegie Report asserts:
The prime learning task of the novice in the law is to achieve a basic acquaintance
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only helpful in training novices in well-structured domains in which
the solution to problems is simple and straightforward.115
Oversimplifying issues does not help learners construct meaning
in ill-structured domains because it can result in different types of “reductive biases.”116 One such bias is the generally incorrect assumption
that parts of a complex process retain their characteristics when integrated into the entire process.117 In the lawyering process, this bias
might result in minimizing the significance of obtaining evidence from
third parties or adversaries. Novice attorneys, who are trained in the
technique of client-centered interviewing, might be prone to overemphasize client-reported information in the fact investigation process.
Another bias resulting from overcompartmentalizing instruction is the
assumption that highly-interrelated elements of a process are independent of each other.118 For example, a law student instructed about the
necessity of using a leading form of questioning in cross examination,
in isolation from an understanding of the overall theories of the case,
might be prone to use that form even when it is detrimental to the
proceeding.119 These errors of oversimplification, cognitive scientists
warn, “can compound each other, building larger scale networks of
durable and consequential misconception.”120 Quite simply, they give
students an artificial sense of the expert practice of law and can have
enduring negative effects.121
Rather than compartmentalizing concepts, cognitive flexibility
with the common techniques of the lawyer’s craft. The novice should not be asked to
exercise judgment or interpret a situation as a whole. Instead, the novice must learn
to recognize certain well-defined elements, regardless of what else is happening.
See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 117.
115 Patel et al., supra note 107, at 180; Spiro et al., supra note 110, at 60-61 (comparing
the fairly well-structured problems of basic physics with the application of those concepts
in “messy” real-world engineering problems).
116 Spiro et al., supra note 110, at 62.
117 See id.
118 Id.
119 While we are raising questions about the use of these techniques, we do not advocate
discarding instruction in lawyering methods, such as client-centered interviewing or crossexamination drills. Rather, we are asserting only that overemphasis on the use of these
techniques, as suggested by the Carnegie Report, may be detrimental to the acquisition of
cognitive flexibility by law students. These techniques do have some use in introducing
students to certain discrete skills. For overall instruction in lawyering skills, however, it is
more important to adopt methods by which students can acquire the cognitive flexibility
that will enable them to handle ill-structured problems effectively.
120 Spiro et al., supra note 110, at 62.
121 As a medical educator observes:
believing that students should only memorize rules has a dark side and can cause
deleterious consequences. When rules are available for everything, novices can spare
the effort of imagining a different way to solve an [ill-structured] problem. Hence,
they would tend to proceed to solve problems in a rather mindless way.
Peña, supra note 66, at 7.
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theory focuses on the connection between different concepts and their
interaction and variations across contexts.122 The theory suggests that
learners in ill-structured domains can acquire the durable ability to
construct understanding in complex situations only by “revisiting the
same material, at different times, in rearranged contexts, for different
purposes, and from different conceptual perspectives.”123 In an arena
like legal practice, any single explanation of a complex concept or case
will miss important facets that would have greater or lesser significance in a different context.124
Accordingly, as researchers suggest for medical education, cases
in law school experiential courses should cover a range of situations
and problems that use different pieces of knowledge or the same
knowledge in different ways. Also, emphasis should be put on the relations among case problems and between cases and concepts. The
focus on these relations reveals how knowledge can be reconstructed
for novel situations, highlighted by examining the same cases from
multiple perspectives and with different goals.125
3. Adaptive Expertise
Finally, in examining the nature of expertise, cognitive scientists
posit that experts possess “adaptive expertise.” Adaptive expertise entails the ability to use standard strategies to efficiently solve problems
in routine situations, and the ability to develop innovative strategies to
solve problems in novel situations.126 Without efficient use of
schemas, a practitioner’s attention is overwhelmed with details. Without some innovation, however, one cannot handle the new problems
that often arise in ill-structured domains.127 The most effective experts
have the metacognition to distinguish between these two types of situations and to judge when to be efficient and when to be innovative.128
Research has indicated that this metacognitive ability reflects a
deep, theory-based understanding of the domain.129 Drawing from
that understanding, adaptive experts are able to distinguish semi-automatically between those situations which require only the use of stan122

Patel et al., supra note 107, at 180.
Spiro et al., supra note 110, at 65.
124 See id. at 65.
125 Patel et al., supra note 107, at 180.
126 Id. at 188.
127 Valerie M. Crawford & Susan Brophy, Adaptive Expertise: Theory, Methods, Findings, and Emerging Issues, http://ctl.sri.com/publications/downloads/AESymposiumReport
Oct06.pdf at 12 (2006).
128 Id. at 13.
129 Susan M. Barnett & Barbara Koslowski, Adaptive Expertise: Effects of Experience
and the Level of the Theoretical Understanding It Generates, 8 THINKING & REASONING
237, 252 (2002).
123
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dard schemas and those which demand more deliberate and
innovative reasoning. They are also able to recognize situations in
which their knowledge is limited, requiring consultation with those
who have more expertise in the domain. Similarly, this deep understanding helps experts identify those problems that require collaboration with other practitioners, whether within or outside of their
domain.
To help students acquire adaptive expertise, more is required in
the instructional process than the Carnegie Report’s recommendation
that novices “achieve a basic acquaintance with the common techniques of the lawyer’s craft.”130 To foster adaptive expertise, researchers recommend that novices be exposed to a variety of problems with
differing complexity but sharing a similar theoretical base. With appropriate feedback during this process, learners can begin to distinguish between routine problems and those that require more
deliberate consideration, consultation with an expert, or collaboration
with others.131 In the law school context, this recommendation suggests that clinical and other experiential courses should be designed to
provide students with different experiences in cases of varying complexity in a particular subject matter area. These experiences may enable novices to achieve an understanding that not all cases are major
federal actions, nor are they simply run-of-the-mill proceedings. Some
tasks require close consultation with supervisors, while others can be
handled independently. And in some situations, nonlawyers and experts in other fields might be helpful in addressing the client’s
problem.

130 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 117. The Carnegie Report does recommend that
students become “metacognitive” about their learning, but, in the context of the entire
study, it is unclear what the authors mean by the use of that term. The Report asserts,
“[T]he essential goal of professional schools must be to form practitioners who are aware
of what it takes to be competent in their chosen domain and to equip them with the reflective capacity and motivation to pursue genuine expertise. They must become ‘metacognitive’ about their own learning.” Id. at 173. Without any further explanation about the
nature of the metacognition process, this recommendation is opaque and unhelpful. It suggests simply and generally that students should become reflective about their learning but
fails to flesh out a specific description of what this reflective capacity entails.
131 See Crawford & Brophy, supra note 127, at 17–18. As these authors observe, “Much
learning in the professions occurs by tacit acquisition. It is important to consider how to
engineer learning experiences in the context of practice to encourage people to become
adaptive through their learning.” Id. at 17. Accordingly, adaptive expertise is not necessarily taught by pedantic lessons in the virtue of this ability, but rather through experiences
that help novices tacitly acquire it.
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OUTCOME ASSESSMENT IN LAW SCHOOL
EXPERIENTIAL COURSES

A. Carnegie Report Recommendations on Assessing
Lawyering Skills
To assess student learning in lawyering skills courses, the Carnegie Report urges the use of methods that evaluate the learner’s development of expertise.132 While we do not disagree with this
approach to outcome assessment, our differences with Carnegie arise
from its conception of expertise. Since cognitive processes play only a
secondary role in expert practice, when viewed through the CarnegieDreyfus lens, performance becomes the primary focus of outcome assessment in experiential courses. Alternatively, following the research
described in the prior section, we suggest that cognitive competence is
an essential element of expertise. In our view, then, assessment must
consider not only a learner’s performance, but also the cognitive
processes revealed during that performance.
Following Dreyfus, Carnegie envisions law schools where students “acquire[ ] mature skill by moving from a distanced manipulation of clearly delineated elements of a situation according to formal
rules toward involved behavior based on an accumulation of concrete
experience.”133 Focusing on the students’ development of “involved
behavior,” the Report asserts that, “[s]ound assessment [of lawyering
skills] must include an evaluation of students actually performing.”134
When outcomes are framed in terms of a student’s ability to utilize particular protocols or techniques, assessment is likely to focus on
how well the student adhered to the protocol or applied the technique: For example, did the student start with open questions and
gradually narrow her questioning? Did she use the T-funnel technique
designed for this particular situation? Did the student effectively follow the PrOACT protocol by identifying problems, setting objectives,
developing alternatives, evaluating consequences, and structuring
tradeoffs?
One example of this type of performance-focused assessment
comes from Best Practices, which describes a rubric for assessing stu132 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 171-73. The authors of the Report obviously do
not claim that law schools can prepare students in three years to become expert practitioners, but they do suggest that, by graduation, students should have begun to acquire some of
the attributes of expertise. We concur with this proposition. Most recent cognitive science
studies show that it takes people at least ten years of intense involvement with a skill or
profession to acquire expertise. Ericsson, Deliberate Practice, supra note 83, at S72; K.
Anders Ericsson, Ralf T. Krampe & Clemens Tesch-Römer, The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 363, 366 (1993).
133 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 172.
134 Id. at 174.
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dents’ progress toward expertise in lawyer-client communication
skills.135 In this model, client interviewing has been broken down into
discrete segments, and evaluators use eight questions to measure student proficiency in lawyer-client communication:
1. Were the greeting and introduction appropriate?
2. Did the lawyer listen to the client?
3. Did the lawyer use a helpful approach to questioning?
4. Did the lawyer accurately summarize the client’s situation?
5. Did the client understand what the lawyer was saying?
6. Did the client feel comfortable with the lawyer?
7. Would the client feel comfortable having the lawyer deal
with her situation?
8. Would the client come back to this lawyer if she had a new
legal problem?136
For each of these eight elements, proficiency can be assessed on a
highly specific scale and given a score between 1 and 5. For example,
the sixth criterion, client comfort with the lawyer, is scaled as follows:
1 point: Lawyer was bored, uninterested, rude, unpleasant, cold
or obviously insincere.
2 points: Lawyer was mechanical, distracted, nervous, insincere,
or used inappropriate remarks.
3 points: Lawyer was courteous to the client and encouraged the
client to confide in her.
4 points: Lawyer was generally attentive to and interested in the
client. The client felt confident to confide in her.
5 points: Lawyer showed a genuine and sincere interest in the
client. There was a sense of connection between the client
and the lawyer.137
Using this set of clear and observable criteria, a student interview
can be given a score from 8 to 40 to indicate the student’s level of
proficiency in professional expertise in communication with clients.
This assessment scale is based entirely on elements of student performance that do not require any evaluation of the student’s
reasoning.
135
136
137

STUCKEY ET
Id.
Id. at 247.

AL.,

supra note 9, at 246-7.
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The appeal to teachers of a checklist approach to assessment is
not insignificant. This kind of method is relatively straightforward and
unambiguous in its application, with clear goals and clear criteria for
evaluation.138 Problematically, however, by focusing on whether the
student adequately follows a checklist of performance elements, this
type of assessment diminishes the importance of the student’s reasoning process as she engages with the lawyering problem.
Pointing to assessment methods in medical education, Carnegie
seems to concur with this checklist approach. The Report notes approvingly that in the early years of medical school, students are evaluated on their ability to take medical histories and perform physical
examinations on actors playing the role of “standardized patients.”
Later, they are observed by supervisors in their interactions with actual patients, and still later, they are assessed in their residencies on a
wide range of other “technical and interpersonal skills.”139 Carnegie
recommends the use of a similar approach of ongoing performance
assessment in law school skills programs.140
Besides its reference to assessment in medical school, the Report
cites no supporting evidence of a correlation between performance
assessments and accurate evaluation of developing expertise in lawyering skills. Nor does it cite to any empirical evidence supporting
performance-based assessment in medical training. Relying on the
Dreyfus model, the authors of the Report simply argue that since expertise is exhibited by particular types of behavior, performance
should be the focus of the assessment of lawyering skills.
A review of the empirical research on this subject raises serious
doubt about Carnegie’s unsupported claims regarding the benefits of
performance assessment of students’ learning of lawyering skills.
While Carnegie is correct that performance assessment has become
quite the rage in medical education, little empirical research exists on
whether such methods are valid measures of clinical competence.141
Indeed, one major study in the medical field suggests that in assessing
clinical ability, cognitive competence may be at least as important as,
if not more important than, performance.142
138 Students are also likely to embrace performance-based assessment. They will be assessed favorably if they simply select and apply the proper tool from their toolkit of lawyering techniques.
139 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 175.
140 Id.
141 Geoff Norman, So What Does Guessing the Right Answer Out of Four Have to Do
with Competence Anyway?, 77 BAR EXAMINER, Nov. 2008, at 18.
142 Robyn Tamblyn, Physician Scores on a National Clinical Skills Examination as
Predictors of Complaints to Medical Regulatory Authorities, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 993
(2007). Interestingly, in the Carnegie Foundation’s recently published study of medical education, the authors (a different set than those who studied legal education) acknowledge
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In this study, researchers examined the relationship between patient complaints to medical regulatory authorities about the nature of
their physician’s care and the physician’s previous performance on the
Canadian medical licensing exam. The research sample included all
3,424 physicians who took the licensing exam between 1993 and 1996
and were licensed to practice in Ontario and/or Quebec. Researchers
then compiled data on all complaints filed with provincial regulatory
authorities between 1993 and 2005 which were investigated and found
to be valid. For each physician, they determined complaint rates, derived by dividing the number of valid complaints by years of practice
time, for two different types of complaints, those concerning communication issues and those concerning quality of care. Finally, the researchers compared the two different complaint rates with each
physician’s performance on the various components of the licensing
exam.143
One part of the licensing exam assessed medical knowledge using
approximately 450 multiple-choice questions about medicine, surgery,
obstetrics-gynecology, pediatrics, psychiatry, and preventive
medicine.144 A second component assessed clinical decision-making
skills using write-in or menu-selection response formats on 36 to 40
clinical problems concerning critical aspects of diagnosis or management. Grades on these problems were not based on a single correct
answer but on the relative quality of the responses regarding critical
decisions in situations in which errors could affect the patient outcome.145 Essentially, this part tested the candidate’s cognitive ability
to solve problems in practice. The final part was a performance-based
standardized patient examination which asked candidates to interact
with simulated patients for five to ten minutes. Trained physician-observers assessed candidates in a number of areas, including data collection (e.g. medical history and physical examination) and
communication skills (e.g., whether the test-taker used condescending,
offensive, or judgmental behaviors or ignored patient responses). In
this final section, problem-solving skills were assessed by post-encounter questions on diagnosis, investigation, interpretation of test results,
and management. Physician-examiners used an answer key to score
that, “[m]uch work remains to be done to establish the reliability and validity . . . of performance assessment” of complex clinical skills. MOLLY COOKE, DAVID M. IRBY &
BRIDGET C. O’BRIEN, EDUCATING PHYSICIANS: A CALL FOR REFORM OF MEDICAL
SCHOOL AND RESIDENCY 107 (2010). The Carnegie Report on educating lawyers contains
none of this cautionary language about performance assessment.
143 Robyn Tamblyn, supra note 142, at 994-95.
144 Id. at 995.
145 Id.
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these responses.146
After examining the data, researchers found that the best predictor of quality-of-care complaints was the licensing exam’s clinical decision-making component, which focused on the cognitive ability of
candidates to solve problems. The better the test-taker’s score on that
part of the exam, the lower the complaint rate for that physician. Although high scores on the communications component of the performance exam were not as good a predictor of low quality-of-care
complaint rates, researchers also found a statistically significant inverse correlation between that measure and such rates.147 Additionally, researchers found that scores on both the communication part of
the performance exam and on the clinical decision-making exam
served inversely, and at nearly the same level, as predictors of communication complaint rates.148 Finally, researchers found a statistically
significant inverse relationship between overall complaint rates and
scores on the multiple-choice and clinical decision-making sections, as
well as on the communication component of the performance exam.149
In sum, scores on the clinical decision-making component of the
licensing exam were better inverse predictors of complaint rates than
any other component of the exam. Clinical decision-making scores
fared just as well as inverse predictors of overall complaints as the
communications component of the exam. Those scores were better inverse predictors of quality-of-care complaints than any other component of the exam. Moreover, even in terms of complaints from actual
patients about communication problems, the scores on the clinical decision-making exam were comparable to those on the communications
exam as an inverse predictor of complaints. And surprisingly, even the
score on the multiple-choice medical knowledge component of the
exam was a statistically significant inverse predictor of the overall
complaint rate.150
146 Id. By measuring problem-solving skills using an answer key, the licensing body was
not assessing the cognitive processes used by the test-takers as much as their “correct”
performance on a post-examination quiz.
147 Id. at 999. Researchers found no statistically significant relationship between qualityof-care complaint rates and scores on the multiple-choice part of the exam or on the data
acquisition and problem-solving components of the performance exam.
148 Id. Researchers found no statistically significant relationship between communication complaint rates and scores on the multiple-choice part of the exam or on the data
acquisition and problem-solving components of the performance exam.
149 Id. The best inverse predictors of any complaint were scores on the clinical decisionmaking and communications exams. No statistically significant relationship was found between overall complaint rates and the data acquisition and problem-solving components of
the licensing exam.
150 Indeed, a major researcher in the area of medical education asserts that multiplechoice tests appear to consistently outperform performance tests in terms of measured
validity. Norman, supra note 141, at 19-20.
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Of course, there are limitations to the conclusions that can be
drawn from this study. It is open to question whether or not the number of complaints to regulatory authorities reflects a practitioner’s actual expertise. Moreover, the different experiences of the subjects
after graduation were not considered in the analysis of the data. But
even with these limitations, given the large sample size and the
twelve-year period over which researchers tracked licensing exam
scores and complaints, the study certainly provides stronger support
for its conclusions than the Carnegie Report does for relying uncritically on analogies between legal education and standardized patient
performance assessment in medical education.
Admittedly, we cannot be certain that research findings regarding
the medical profession are transferable to the legal profession. Nevertheless, this major medical study raises serious questions about the
focus of Carnegie and the Dreyfuses on performance as a primary
measure of ability in practice. Contrary to the assumption implicit in
the Carnegie Report’s recommendations, performance assessment
may not be the best measure of a student’s long-term lawyering ability. Instead, scores on tests of clinical reasoning and cognitive
processes appear to be better predictors of acquisition of expertise
and ability in practice. At the very least, this research should call into
question a headlong rush to adopt Carnegie’s recommendations to use
performance as the primary assessment tool for measuring lawyering
skills.
B. Assessment of Cognitive Competence
If the Canadian study is correct that assessment of clinical reasoning ability is a significant factor in measuring a learner’s acquisition of
expertise, an issue arises as to the best methods for evaluating the
development of such competence. As described in Part II, cognitive
science research has demonstrated that expert reasoning has a number
of attributes: the use of schemas, cognitive flexibility, and adaptive
expertise. While it is easy to assess a test-taker’s performance with a
standardized patient, it is much more difficult to determine whether
the reasoning of a test-taker demonstrates any of these attributes.
Simply stated, it is impossible to peer into someone’s head, as “thinking cannot be observed by other people.”151
To address this problem, one of the experimental methods now
employed by medical educators to assess cognitive competence is the
use of the “think-aloud” interviewing methods employed in cognitive
151 K. Anders Ericsson, Protocol Analysis, in A COMPANION
425 (William Bechtel & George Graham, eds., 1998).

TO

COGNITIVE SCIENCE
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science studies of the reasoning process.152 The purpose of using this
method is to replicate as closely as possible the actual cognitive process of the subjects. Under the think-aloud protocol, researchers ask
subjects during the interview to verbalize their thoughts spontaneously as they emerge into their attention.153 Even though use of this
method does not provide a perfect match between subjects’ thoughts
and reports, researchers have found consistently strong evidence that
this method results in a strong correlation between the two.154
In medical education studies of this method, interviewers provide
medical residents with problem scenarios describing patient histories,
known symptoms, and the proposed case management in each instance. The residents are asked to think aloud as they read these scenarios, to summarize the case history, and to evaluate the proposed
case management. The interviews are recorded and transcribed. The
researchers then review the transcripts to assess the reasoning used by
the residents in practice.155
IV.

USE

OF

THINK-ALOUD INTERVIEWS

WITH

LAW STUDENTS

Using the medical field’s “think aloud” technique as inspiration,
we have designed an experimental assessment method intended to
identify the different kinds of cognitive processes used by students as
they solve problems in practice. Specifically, we give students in a
clinical program a hypothetical problem that is representative of work
they have experienced in the program, and record them as we ask
them to talk it through. Our hypothesis is that by prodding students to
talk about a problem without a filter, we will understand, as much as
we possibly can, what they are thinking “in practice.”
A. Methodology for Think-Aloud Assessments
1. Creating Hypothetical Scenarios for Think-Aloud Assessments
The goal of our experiment is to give us insight into the development of specific cognitive processes used by our students in practice.
Specifically, as a means of assessing their progress toward expert prac152 Telephone Interview with Vimla Patel, Professor of Biomedical Informatics, School
of Health Information Sciences, University of Texas Health Sciences Center, in Houston,
TX (Mar. 28, 2010).
153 Researchers have also found that if subjects are asked to recall their reasoning process after a long delay, the completeness and accuracy of recall is impaired. Subjects are
prone to infer their thoughts as opposed to correctly recalling them from memory. Ericsson, supra note 151, at 429, 430.
154 Id. at 430.
155 E-mail from Vimla Patel, Professor of Biomedical Informatics, School of Health Information Sciences, University of Texas Health Sciences Center, to Stefan Krieger, Professor of Law, Hofstra University (Mar. 31, 2010, 8:23 p.m. EDT) (on file with authors).
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tice, we are trying to observe their schemas for representation of
problems, their cognitive flexibility, and their development of adaptive expertise. With these objectives in mind, we designed our hypothetical scenarios with the following goals:
a. Lead students to access the schemas that they have created for
addressing particular issues that commonly arise in representation.
We developed the hypotheticals within the context of a clinic-specific problem, to allow our students to draw on doctrinal knowledge
and mental models that they should have developed through their
clinical work.156 To identify and evaluate the mental models that
they had already constructed, we examined how they approached a
reasonably familiar problem. Students in completely unfamiliar environments, we reasoned, were not likely to rely on schemas that
had been developed through their clinic work.
b. Require the students to attend to multiple issues simultaneously. We created hypotheticals with multiple, complex, and interrelated elements to assess our students’ ability to handle several
elements at the same time, balance them, and understand how their
consideration of these elements changed when students perceived
their interaction.
c. Present novel problems. To test our students’ adaptive expertise, which required observing their ability to recognize and respond
to novel situations, we presented them with problems containing elements that did not fit neatly within the routine schemas that we
expected them to have developed in the clinic. In addition, to test
their ability to recognize the limits of their own expertise and the
need to consult with those who had more expertise, we included
elements that we considered too advanced for clinic students.

2. Conducting the Think-Aloud Interviews
We invited several clinic students to participate in the project,
emphasizing that they would not be graded. We then asked a colleague—one with whom the students did not have a relationship—to
conduct on-camera interviews with the students. We used an independent interviewer to prevent any undue influence from our own preexisting relationships with the students. We feared that the students
might be intimidated by our presence or feel compelled to give responses we expected. We also wanted to avoid the possibility that we
might influence the students’ responses with our questions or reactions to their comments.
In the actual interviews, the interviewer simply gave a written hypothetical to the students and asked them to think aloud through their
156

See Appendix.
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responses as they reviewed the problem. The interviewer followed up
as needed with open-ended questions to help the students express
their thoughts, to make sure they continued to think aloud, and to
encourage them to explore as fully as possible their reasoning
processes as they were happening. The entire interview lasted approximately 15 minutes for each student. Subsequently, we viewed and
transcribed each recorded interview to identify the cognitive processes
used by students in responding to the problem.
3. Using the Interviews to Assess Student Reasoning in Practice
To assess the interviews, we considered the goals of the clinic in
which the student was enrolled, then analyzed the transcript to identify how well the students had met the course goals for development
of cognitive processes. In the next section, we will demonstrate how
the assessment process worked for two students from a single clinic by
describing the clinic’s goals, presenting annotated transcripts of student interviews, and describing possibilities for practical application of
the information developed from these interviews.
B. The Think-Aloud Interviews
1. The Hofstra Community and Economic Development Clinic
The Hofstra Community and Economic Development Clinic (the
“CED” or the “Clinic”) is a one semester, non-litigation clinic that
mainly represents small community-based organizations and
microbusinesses owned by aspiring entrepreneurs. While there is wide
variety in the work of the Clinic, a core element is helping inchoate
not-for-profit and for-profit organizations choose and create the most
appropriate corporate form. During the semester, students have the
opportunity to counsel several clients about the particular set of issues
that arise at the early stages in the development of a small entity.
The CED has pedagogical goals, both general and domain-specific, that drive course design, teaching, and client selection. The CED
is designed to cultivate in students the following cognitive processes:
a. Schemas: Students should develop mental models that serve as a
framework for understanding and dealing with lawyering problems.
In the CED, these schemas should include:
i. A schema for helping a client choose the form of a corporate
entity, and then creating that entity;
ii. Because all of the Clinic’s clients are groups or entities, a
schema for asking and answering the question, “Who is the client?,” and identifying and addressing other ethical issues relating to non-individual client representation;
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iii. A schema for understanding the attorney-client relationship
and the role of the attorney in representation, including applying ethical rules to representation; and
iv. A schema for identifying and understanding client goals and
priorities.
b. Cognitive Flexibility: Students should be able to identify and
keep track of several different factors simultaneously. In the CED,
these factors frequently include:
i. Activities of the organization (especially as they relate to
qualification as a New York not-for-profit corporation and/or a
501(c)(3) exempt organization);
ii. Involvement in lobbying and political campaigns;
iii. Sources of finance;
iv. Taxes;
v. Corporate governance and control;
vi. Liability; and
vii. Other client-specific goals.
c. Adaptive Expertise: Students should be able to distinguish between “routine” and novel situations, as well as to understand when
a situation is beyond their ability to handle and requires consultation with those who have more expertise.

Obviously, this list is ambitious. In practice, students are unlikely
to master all of these cognitive processes over the course of a fourmonth semester. The goal of the CED is to help students start to develop their ability to reason in practice through their work with
clients.
2. Think-Aloud Interviews
In this section, we share the transcripts from two of our student
interviews, coded for the students’ reasoning processes.157 Each interview was conducted at the end of the subject’s semester in the CED.

157

Videos can be viewed at: http://studentlegalreasoning.info.
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David
Luscious Landscaping Scenario158

Commentary

In terms of immigration status, I’d – We
need to look further into that.
Well they feel that they don’t want to be in
the position of asking for or providing
immigration about their immigration –
information about their immigration status.
So I would obviously look—if they were my
clients, I would represent their interests and
do what’s possible to limit the type of
information that they may need to give while
complying with our regulations as imposed
by the law. I would do further research into
seeing if that in fact creates a conflict by
withholding their immigration status or not.
If it’s not a problem then I don’t assume we
need to go further into it but if there are
some policy issues, then definitely. So that’s
where I would start – that’s pretty much
where I would start.

Cognitive Flexibility: David takes note of the
immigration issue as a potential factor in
client decision. However, this is the last time
he mentions it in this exercise.
Adaptive Expertise: David is aware that the
immigration issue is beyond his expertise,
and that he needs to conduct research to
learn more.

I would certainly ask the clients – or
prospective clients – what their immediate
needs are and where these needs rank,
whether they’re interested in creating a
business or in working to develop the
community and stand up for unskilled Latino
laborers or Latino laborers in general. . .

Schema: David has a framework for
understanding the lawyer’s role at this stage.
He also shows that he has a model for
identifying client goals and helping the clients
prioritize among them.

And in doing so, I would – obviously I would
use that information to decide whether I’d
like to – I would suggest using – creating a
not-for-profit corporation or a general
corporation. They say they want to form a
corporation but I don’t necessarily know if
they know the difference and the intricacies
of corporations and not-for-profits or even
creating LLCs while still limiting their
liability but not having to pay different
taxes. . .So I would, you know, create – I
would make a long list of options for these
clients, choice-of-entity decisions for them
initially.

Schema: The framework that David is using
for identifying client goals suggests that just
because clients might say they want
something doesn’t mean that that is what will
best meet their needs. He wants to dig a
little deeper.

But I would also – I would like to, you
know, list exactly where their needs stand
which, you know. . .What are their primary
needs versus what are their secondary.

Schema: David comes back to the
importance of the lawyer knowing how
important each client goal is relative to the
others.

158

See Appendix.

Schema: David’s model of the lawyer’s role
includes developing and presenting options to
a client.
Cognitive Flexibility: There are many options
with lots of permutations that are
interconnected. David is aware of this, even
though at this point he does not expand on
his thinking.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYC\19-1\NYC105.txt

286

unknown

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

I would. . .First of all, I’d like to know
exactly who’s involved. If, you know, it says
they’re representing a group of 5 men so –
but they have ideas of representing all of
Latino laborers so I would have to inform
this person that I’m speaking to and
following up with that I would be
representing their corporation and not just
them and that my representation extends to
everybody that’s involved with the
corporation – all the directors and officers
that represent the corporation and that my
legal representation would be towards the
corporation that they created, not just them.
So I would find out what their needs are in
terms of the corporation as a whole. And
also other information as to who else I can
speak to because I wouldn’t be representing
this one person, I’d be representing the
corporation. Umm. . .I would – again, I
would do some research into current
organizations in the area to see if –
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Schema: David has developed a schema that
emphasizes the importance of understanding
who the individuals are and their relationship
to “the client.”
Adaptive Expertise: David recognizes that
this is not an area that he has a framework
for understanding, so he comes up with a
plan to get more information and seek out
guidance from others to help him explore
this situation.

I mean, obviously I would check the name
availability. They sound like they have a
name – “Luscious Landscaping” – that they’d
like to use so if that’s not available, I’d have
to inform them that that’s not possible.
But also I would, you know, I would see
what other corporations are – or
organizations are around in the community
and are they succeeding in what their style
and structure is.

Schema: David is demonstrating a model for
the formative stages of any corporate entity
in New York.

I would certainly call up the – I know certain
regulations have changed in terms of the
purposes that the Department of State is
looking for in order to create not-for-profit
corporations so I would look for some
guidance by the Department of State as to if
I were trying to create this type of
organization, exactly how to word the type of
purposes or exempt purposes that the notfor-profit corporation would be looking for in
order to, you know, speed up the
incorporation process.

Schema: David shows that he has a robust
schema for nonprofit formation.
Adaptive Expertise: David seems very locked
into the nonprofit schema—he appears to be
having difficulty identifying this as a case that
does not comfortably fit within his existing
schemas and that will require some
innovation.

And I would also, you know, I would ask
around, I would find out – ask my colleagues
and ask other people in the clinic who are in
the process of incorporating their clients and
find out exactly how they’ve complied with
the State’s requirements and use all resources
that the clinic has that I could find.

Adaptive Expertise: David realizes that this
is not an area that he has enough expertise
to handle alone, and that he will need some
help from his colleagues. However, he is still
thinking about procedural issues that are
specific to the formation of nonprofit
organizations. He seems to be having trouble
accepting that this problem may not fit
within his non-profit framework.

I would investigate further who else is
involved in the project. If it’s just this one
person who I’m speaking to, I would like
some other contact information for who else
would be involved or who else would be a
director of the corporation. It sounds like an
interesting client. I’d like to help them.

Schemas: David has returned to his earlier
concern about who is the client, who is the
person he will be interacting with, etc. This
gives a good picture of how robust this
schema is with this student.
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No, I would certainly – I’d like to go and do
some of my own personal research on the
Latino laborers and the Latino community in
the area and determine some of the, you
know, needs of those laborers. You know,
determine myself and be able to bring some
information to the table that might either be
different from what my client may bring up
or, you know, create conversation.

Adaptive Expertise: David realizes that this
is a novel problem and that he will probably
be able to represent the client better by
understanding the community that they want
to help.

I know that they are looking to reduce their
tax liability, so I would certainly suggest that
if they were interested in creating a
corporation that they might create an LLC so
that they’re not doubly taxed like a
corporation.

Cognitive Flexibility: He has identified
reducing taxes as a factor in helping the
clients with their goals. He does not,
however, resolve—or even identify—the
tension between this and other client goals.

Now if they’re a not-for-profit corporation
and they’re interested in, you know, helping
the Latino community versus making a
profit, then, you know, I would have to
address all the IRS regulations of taking
recognition of tax exempt status and such.

Cognitive Flexibility: David addresses the
for-profit/not-for-profit dichotomy and the
tension inherent in the client’s stated goals.
He does not seem to make much progress
toward understanding the tension or how it
impacts his client’s goals.

I don’t know if I would necessarily go along
the lines of, you know, if I would go with a
not-for-profit corporation. It does seem like
this is a business venture for them and one
of the side points is that they, you know, in
turn would like to help the Latino
community. But if it is in fact a business
venture, then I think we’re focusing on
corporations versus LLCs or C-Corps and
different entities – profit-making entities. So,
but in reducing tax liability then obviously
the LLC would be more favorable than
creating a C-Corp. Let’s see if I missed any –

Cognitive Flexibility: David is struggling with
the tension between the group’s charitable
aims and its business aims. He never resolves
this issue and ignores other elements, such as
outside sources of funding.
Schema: David’s use of “I” indicates that he
has a framework for his role in the decisionmaking process that puts him at the
forefront.
Adaptive Expertise: David has escaped from
his purely nonprofit schema. Now, however,
he is locked into an either-or scenario: a
nonprofit or a for-profit. He does not seem
to think that this situation requires more
innovation, such as exploring the idea of two
side-by-side organizations, a joint venture, no
organization at all, or other possible
innovative solutions.

Mary
Rivertown Redevelopment159
Okay – So I see that it’s not a good
neighborhood and they want to do economic
revitalization so I’m thinking maybe nonprofit.

Schema: Mary has developed a
representational framework for nonprofit
organizations, and she is seeing how well her
client fits that schema.

Training – So I’m thinking we’re going to
have to get consent from the Department of
Education.

Schema: This is a routine step in
incorporation of New York nonprofit
organizations—Mary has a schema for how
this process goes.

Okay, so then. . .since the 3 of them want to
work together, I would talk to them about
the different types of corporations that they
want to set up. If they want to, they could
do, like, a partnership but then they would
have personal liabilities. . .So then, otherwise,
they could do a corporation or a limited
liability company – it depends how much
they have for start-up costs – which it seems
like they do have their own funds so they
might want to do that.

Cognitive Flexibility: Mary sees that there is
some tension here: partnerships would entail
personal liability but are cheap; LLCs limit
liability but are expensive to set up. After
some mental calculus, she realizes that they
probably have funds to do the LLC and that
it would probably be an appealing option.

159

See Appendix.

Adaptive Expertise: Mary does not seem to
consider that there might be other options
than the very few she lays out here.
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And then I would also think about doing a
non-profit – especially because they want
donations and government grants. So a
501(c)(3). So then, how to proceed for that.
Well, first they’d have to incorporate under
New York and make a certificate of
incorporation and then send it to the
Department of State and say that they want
to use – they’re going to be building up the
town – so they’d have to meet non-profit
goals.

Schema: Mary has developed a model for
how to form an organization in New York.
She also shows that she has created a mental
model of the nonprofit that includes
organizations looking for grants and
donations.

And I think that the grocery – well, the
grocery store would make a profit, so. . .
make a profit. . .so then, I think they would
still be fine – maybe if they added something
to help the people? Well, that’s just the
initial phase, also.

Cognitive Flexibility: She identifies and is
trying to deal with the tension between some
of their stated goals—in this case, the tension
between making a profit and having
charitable purposes.

So then, umm, maybe they’d want to do two
different corporations then? Maybe one to –
for the first part of the stuff they wanted to
do like provide employment to local youth
and decrease crimes and then maybe they’d
want to do a separate corporation that would
just run the grocery store because it can
make a profit. And then they could work
together?

Adaptive Expertise: Mary has concluded that
this situation does not fit well within the
schemas she has developed. She stops trying
to fit the client into the non-profit or the forprofit schemas and instead begins to
innovate. Her solution of multiple
organizations working in tandem is creative
and consistent with client goals.

And so, for the first one, I would tell them
to do a non-profit 501(c)(3) and that would
decrease crime and increase local incomes
and provide training for the local work force.
So then they could think of a name and
reserve that or – and then send in the
certificate of incorporation and apply – fill
out a [IRS Form] 1023 to get 501(c)(3) status
so they can get donations and investments in
government grants.

Schema: “I would tell them” suggests a
schema relating to the lawyer’s role in
representation that gives importance to what
the lawyer, rather than the client, wants. It is
not clear from this exercise whether Mary is
wedded to this particular representation
schema.

And then maybe another corporation so that
they could set up the grocery store. And so
that way they could make a profit with that
and help the town in that way also. Umm, I
think that’s it.

Adaptive Expertise: Mary returns to her
innovation of multiple organizations working
together to achieve the client’s stated goals
of helping the community by succeeding.

3. Using Think-aloud Interviews for Student Feedback and Course
Design
The think-aloud interview, like other types of assessment, “offers
two insights: one into the students, and one into the instruction.”160
Neither of these insights is an end in itself; rather they are means to
the end of helping students achieve competence in practice. Insights
about students can be used to give meaningful feedback. Insights into
the effectiveness of instruction can inform course design. In this section, we describe how think-aloud interviews can be used to guide student feedback and assist in course design in ways that help students
develop their reasoning abilities and make progress toward compe160 Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 404
(2001).
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tency in skills.
a. Student Feedback
Think-aloud interviews can help instructors monitor student
learning in order to provide useful feedback to students about their
development of reasoning processes. By watching the videos with students and relating them to the work that students are doing in the
course, the instructor can help students develop their cognitive
frameworks. The purpose of these discussions should not be to tell
students “you did this right” or “you did that wrong,” but rather to
help them identify and reflect on their own reasoning processes.
One element of a post-interview discussion with David, for example, might focus on his continued efforts to make the client’s needs fit
neatly into the schema he had developed for forming and representing
nonprofit corporations. Although much of David’s work in the Clinic
was with nonprofit organizations, the clients in the Luscious Landscaping hypothetical are not likely to benefit from such a structure.
However, rather than address whether David’s was the “correct” approach, a discussion of his reasoning process would focus on understanding why David was reluctant to abandon his preconceived
notions, and ways that he might become more aware of his use of
these notions in the future.
A post-interview discussion with Mary would include discussion
of her suggestion that her clients might be served best by creating
multiple entities. Like David’s, Mary’s Clinic work largely consisted of
representing small nonprofits, and none of her clients required multiple entities to achieve their goals, so the Rivertown Redevelopment &
Revitalization scenario was in some respects a novel situation for
which she had not developed a schema. Discussion of Mary’s reasoning processes, however, would not focus on whether she came up with
the “right” answer, but would address aspects of adaptive expertise,
such as what she was thinking as she identified the novelty of the situation, how she came up with her proposed solution on the fly, and
what consideration she gave to consulting someone with greater expertise. Such a discussion would help Mary and her instructor better
understand the cognitive processes involved in her representation of
clients.
b. Course Design
Think-aloud interviews can also be used to assess the ability of
course design to meet goals for student learning outcomes. We believe
that development of cognitive processes is largely a function of course
design. Students unconsciously develop their own schemas and cogni-
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tive strategies in response to their opportunities to practice with expert feedback.161
Contrary to Carnegie’s suggestion, there is no standard “toolkit”
of protocols and procedures possessed by all experts that can simply
be taught to novices. Rather, through their experiences in practice and
the effective feedback they receive, novices construct their own
schemas for solving problems. The goal of course design should be to
create the environment and feedback mechanisms to nurture the construction of these schemas. The assessment of think-aloud interviews
can help instructors identify areas in which they have assisted students
in developing cognitive frameworks and those in which they have not
been effective.
The interviews with Mary and David suggest that the Clinic could
be more effective in helping students develop cognitive flexibility.
David and Mary each seemed to struggle with considering and balancing multiple factors. To help them develop a framework for cognitive
flexibility, the Clinic might be redesigned to provide more opportunities for students to practice in situations that require keeping track of,
and evaluating, multiple complex factors simultaneously. This change
might be incorporated into in-class exercises and simulations. In addition, as an aid to developing cognitive flexibility, the Clinic might select more clients with problems that require students to understand
the interactions of multiple factors and contingencies.
V. ASSESSMENT OF COMPETENCY AND
PROPOSED STANDARDS

THE

ABA’S

The ABA’s Proposed Standards would require law schools to regularly and continuously assess student competency in learning outcomes.162 We support such a requirement. As we discussed in the
previous section, assessment can be a valuable tool for guiding student
attainment of competency when it is used to give feedback to students
or to shape course design. Assessment is only useful for guiding students to competency, however, if it accurately measures their abilities.
There is a marked difference in the nature—and value—of what can
be learned about competency in skills between assessment of performance and evaluation of reasoning in practice.
For example, in experiential legal education, a typical subject for
assessment is the initial interview with a client, in which the lawyer
meets the client for the first time to begin the representation. An assessment based on performance would evaluate elements such as the
161
162

See Krieger & Martinez, supra note 106, at 127-34.
Draft Report, supra note 13, at Standard 306.
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student’s greeting of the client, whether the student made the client
feel comfortable, how effectively the student applied the T-funnel
technique of asking open-ended questions and then narrowing them
down, how the interview was organized, the appropriateness of the
“small talk” phase of the meeting, the cultural awareness and sensitivity of the student, the discovery of any important deadlines, the degree to which client and lawyer know what happens next, and setting
the time for the next meeting.163
In contrast, an assessment of the same interview focused on the
student’s reasoning would look at very different elements, such as:
What were the student’s goals in the interview? Why did the student
ask a particular question at a particular time? What was the student
thinking when the client said, “I just want justice”? How did the student attend to multiple, competing, interdependent factors such as the
client’s goals, the relevant law, and the interests and resources of the
other party in the case? What legal theories was the student considering while talking to the client? How did the student conceive of her
role in the attorney-client relationship that was developing?
From the performance-based evaluation, we can learn a great
deal about the student’s ability to conduct a coherent interview or to
behave appropriately with a client. Indeed, skills such as these are not
insignificant elements of practice. For example, the lawyer who is not
able to respond to cultural differences in a client interview is bound to
have problems with clients. The lawyer who cannot interview a client
in an organized manner will inevitably miss important information.
We have no problem with teaching students to use techniques such as
the T-funnel interview. In fact, we both teach the T-funnel to our
students.
Nevertheless, an evaluation of a student’s ability to conduct a Tfunnel interview is of limited value in assessing whether the student is
progressing toward expertise, and it should not be used as the sole or
primary measure of competency in interviewing. The fact that a student follows perfect T-funnel protocol does not indicate that she has
acquired the underlying schemas to understand the legal claims of the
client, that she has started to consider the multiple variables at play in
the case, or that she has any insights into novel issues that are raised.
Performance-based assessments capture only the surface elements of
practice, rather than the deeper reasoning processes that are central to
expert practice.
From an assessment of student reasoning, we can understand the
student’s thinking as she works with the lawyering problem. By focus163

See supra notes 134–40 and accompanying text.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYC\19-1\NYC105.txt

292

unknown

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

Seq: 42

15-OCT-12

15:13

[Vol. 19:251

ing on the reasoning process, instructors can see whether the student
is developing and applying schemas, demonstrating cognitive flexibility, or exhibiting the ability to identify novel situations. These are
more significant elements of competency in practice than simple performance skills. Therefore, to assess competency in practical skills, law
schools must implement assessment methods that target students’
ability to reason in practice, not just their ability to perform.
We fear, however, that the ABA and schools moving toward a
focus on learning outcomes will rely too heavily on performancebased assessment, given its relative ease of administration and the
growing number of voices that support this form of assessment. As
discussed previously, Carnegie suggests that assessment of competency in lawyering skills should focus on performance elements.164
Moreover, the small amount of post-Carnegie scholarship that addresses assessment of student competency in practice has tended to
frame student learning in terms of performance skill and to advocate
the use of performance-based rubrics for assessment.165 Although the
amount of this scholarship is limited, a performance-based approach
to assessment of competency in skills seems to be prevailing among
legal scholars.
There is no doubt that performance-focused assessment methods
such as the Best Practices communication skills checklist,166 or the
standardized patient method endorsed by Carnegie,167 have appeal for
educators. Checklist assessments can be easily administered and
164

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 174.
See, e.g., Ann Marie Cavazos, The Journey Toward Excellence in Clinical Legal Education: Developing, Utilizing and Evaluating Methodologies for Determining and Assessing
the Effectiveness of Student Learning Outcomes, 40 SW. L. REV. 1, 37 (2010) (proposing a
comprehensive written evaluation of student performance as well as an oral examination
that primarily focuses on student performance in terms of communications skills, both
scored with a predetermined rubric); Jerry R. Foxhoven, Beyond Grading: Assessing Student Readiness to Practice Law, 16 CLIN. L. REV. 335, 344-8 (2010) (describing assessment
of student competency for practice based on assessment of student work product and student ability to perform various lawyering skills and practices); Lori A. Roberts, Assessing
Ourselves: Confirming Assumptions and Improving Student Learning by Efficiently and
Fearlessly Assessing Student Learning Outcomes, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 457, 479-83 (2010)
(proposing assessment methods for appellate oral advocacy based exclusively on observation of student performance and application of a scoring rubric). But see Anthony
Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning: Improving the Metacognitive Skills of Law
Students through More Effective Formative Assessment Techniques, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 149
(2012) (arguing that assessment should move away from a focus on the end product such as
an oral argument or a negotiation toward a focus on the underlying reasoning process
involved in the production as a means of improving students’ ability to learn from their
experiences).
166 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 246–7. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying
text.
167 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 175. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying
text.
165
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scored in a uniform, straightforward fashion that minimizes subjective
judgment. By contrast, assessing student reasoning is likely to be more
challenging and time-consuming than a checklist-type assessment.
In the think-aloud interviews, student thinking tends to be nonlinear, looping back on itself repeatedly, and it is peppered with fillers
and non-sequiturs. Questions are raised and then revisited again only
much later, if at all. That, of course, is the nature of cognition. Student
reasoning, like all human thinking, is messy. It resists easy decomposition into discrete component parts. Instead, it must be analyzed as a
whole to identify various reasoning processes glimpsed piecemeal
throughout each interview. This analysis requires a deep understanding of the domain, as well as a firm grasp of expert reasoning in practice in that domain.
The challenges of using assessment methods that focus on student
reasoning, however, should not deter the ABA or law schools from
using this type of method. Only by focusing on essential elements of
expertise, such as reasoning in practice, can assessments reveal students’ progress toward becoming experts themselves, and not merely
their ability to imitate experts. Because they target important indicators of competency in practice, educators and the ABA alike should
embrace assessments focused on student reasoning. They should reject the notion that skilled performance is the sole acceptable hallmark of competency in skills. Instead, they should understand that
meaningful assessment of student learning in experiential education
must focus on students’ ability to reason in practice.
CONCLUSION
This is a seminal moment for experiential legal education. The
chorus calling for reform is swelling, and the ABA stands on the verge
of requiring law schools to prepare every student to be competent in
skills when they graduate. These circumstances create an opportunity
for law schools to give careful consideration to the sort of practical
education that they will provide their students.
With the loud voice of the Carnegie Report describing expertise
primarily in terms of performance and the ability to follow protocols
or imitate expert techniques, it might be easy simply to follow Carnegie’s recommendations for teaching and assessing students. Current
scientific research, however, disputes Carnegie’s view of expertise, instead offering important, empirically validated insights into how best
to prepare law students to become expert practitioners.
Cognitive science research into the nature of expertise demonstrates that reasoning, not arational application of “toolkit” techniques to familiar situations, is the hallmark of expert practice.
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Focusing on performance misses the mark. The implications for experiential education are significant. Course design must give students
opportunities to develop the ability to reason in practice, and not simply to learn different expert techniques.
Moreover, this research demonstrates that providing useful feedback to students requires assessment methods that similarly focus on
student reasoning. To properly assess student reasoning, evaluation
must try to get into the heads of students in practice. We do not pretend that the think-aloud interview method we have proposed is the
last word in assessment of student reasoning, but the information we
have been able to extract from our interviews thus far suggests that
this type of assessment can be valuable in evaluating students’ acquisition of expertise. The results so far invite further research to refine the
think-aloud methodology and develop additional methods for assessing reasoning.
Our law students are unlikely to be called upon to land a full
plane on a river in mid-winter, but they will be called upon to serve
clients in complex, challenging situations without precedent. While we
all hope that our students will respond to difficult client problems with
the same expertise that Captain Sullenberger showed, such a result is
only possible if we accurately understand the nature of expertise and
gear our teaching to developing that expertise in our students.
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APPENDIX
Community & Economic Development Hypothetical Scenarios
1. Luscious Landscaping
You represent a group of five men who do landscaping work locally. You are helping them to start a business venture together. You
just met with three of the five men at your office where one of them,
Esteban, started off by telling you “We want to form a Corporation—
what do we need to do?”
Although each of them has been successfully doing small-scale
work for some time now, they want to work together to allow them to
do larger-scale projects, develop a recognizable brand name, and reduce the cost of supplies by buying in bulk. Another reason for entering into this venture together is to try to fight the exploitation that
each of them, as Latino men, has seen within the landscaping world.
They will make sure that Latino laborers are paid decent wages, provide decent employment opportunities for unskilled laborers, and set
a good example of the value of hard work for the increasingly disaffected youth of their Latino community.
They all want to run the business jointly, and they intend to use
their own funds as an initial investment. In the future, they want to
recruit more members (as long as they can assure that the quality of
the work will not suffer) and also to look for outside financing. Because of the low profit margins in this market, they want to keep their
initial costs down as much as possible while still reducing tax liability.
In addition, they feel that they do not want to be in the position of
asking for (or providing) information about immigration status. They
have told you that they want to use the name “Luscious Landscaping,” and they are looking to get this done immediately.
What will you do now?
2. Rivertown Redevelopment & Revitalization
You represent a group of three successful entrepreneurs who
grew up in the community of Rivertown, one of the poorest and most
run down areas of the county, with a high unemployment rate and
terrible housing options. You are helping them to start a project to
revitalize the business and economic climate of Rivertown. You just
met with members of the group at your office.
Each of them has been successful with individual and joint business ventures around the area, and now they want to take their talents
back to the community of Rivertown. Decades ago, Rivertown was a
thriving working-class neighborhood, with a bustling and modern
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Main Street that was home to locally-owned small businesses, employing hundreds of local residents and bringing lots of capital into the
area. Now there’s just an abandoned main street with a couple liquor
stores and a barely surviving small hardware shop, surrounded by dilapidated housing and a lot of unemployed residents.
The group wants to create a project that will improve the economic climate in Rivertown and attract more new businesses. The ultimate goal is to provide employment for local residents, increase local
incomes, set a positive example for local youth, decrease crime, improve the area’s political power, and help restore Rivertown to its
glory days. To begin, they envision doing things like providing training
for the local workforce, developing a unified façade for the
storefronts, installing streetlights, creating a pedestrian zone with sidewalk cafes, and improving security.
As part of the initial phase of this initiative, the group wants to
lease one of the empty storefronts to open a grocery store that will sell
healthy and affordable food. Currently, Rivertown has no grocery
stores, just a few delis and a bunch of fast food chains. They believe
that a successful grocery will show other retailers that Rivertown is a
good place to do business and will help speed the project along.
They all want to control the project jointly. They intend to use
their own funds as an initial investment, but they think they will need
donations, outside investors, and/or government grants to make their
vision a reality. They have big dreams for the place they came from,
but no experience in this area, so they came to you for counsel on how
to proceed.
What will you do now?

